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PENALIZING THE POOR: DURATIONAL
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
WELFARE BENEFITS
INTRODUCTION

Nearly thirty years ago, in Shapiro v. Thompson,1 the Supreme Court held that statutes imposing one-year durational
residency requirements for payment of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits were unconstitutional denials of equal protection. The Court based its decision on the
premise that such durational residency requirements "penalized"
the welfare recipients' fundamental right to interstate migration,
thus triggering strict scrutiny.2 In the wake of Shapiro, Justices
have grappled with the source of the right to interstate migration and the contours of the Court's "penalty" analysis. Critics
have alleged that Shapiro "establish[ed] a basis for increased
judicial activism."3 Courts have described the right to travel doctrine that has sprung forth from Shapiro as "an area of jurisprudence that is unsettled and clearly in need of clarification by the
United States Supreme Court."4 Indeed, the Supreme Court will
likely have the occasion to revisit Shapiro in the near future because of a resurgence of state durational residency requirements
for welfare benefits.
In 1996, with the support of President Clinton, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"). 5 PRWORA decentralized
welfare and gave the states greater leeway to experiment with
benefit packages through the use of federal block grants. Critics
1

394 U.S. 618 (1969).

See id. at 634. The court characterized the strict scrutiny analysis as
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest." Id.
2

3 The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Recent Decisions: Equal Protection, State
Residence Requirements for Welfare Recipients, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 120 (1969)
[hereinafter "Welfare Recipients"].
4 Maldonado

v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
5Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 742 U.S.C. §§ 7, 8, 21, 25, 42).
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of PRWORA anticipate a "race to the bottom"6 as states design
less attractive benefits packages in order to prevent their state
from becoming a "welfare magnet."7 Proponents of PRWORA assert that states can avert the race to the bottom by enacting
multi-tiered durational residency requirements to discourage
migrant welfare recipients from settling in a given state." Although several states had already enacted such requirements
prior to PRWORA,9 the Act has prompted a resurgence in the
use of durational residency requirements to deter indigent migration. As state and federal courts consider challenges to the
constitutionality of these provisions, the legal and philosophical
underpinnings of Shapiro move closer toward Supreme Court
review.
This Note will examine how courts have applied Shapiro v.
Thompson thus far in the era of welfare reform cases and will
propose how Shapiro should have been applied in those cases.
Part I will discuss Shapiro and its progeny. Part II will briefly
address the sources of the right to interstate migration. Part III
will describe the new welfare legislation. Part IV will examine
how modern courts have applied Shapiro to a variety of durational residency requirements that restrict welfare benefits.
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should rule that
6 See,

e.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Had Done, ATLANTIC

MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43 (criticizing the Act and predicating that states "will try
to make their benefit structures less, not more, attractive").
7 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, Devolution's Price, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 116-18
(1996) [hereinafter "Devolution"] ("States whose welfare benefits are relatively high
have become welfare magnets-places that attract poor people because they offer
higher cash benefits than other states.").
See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race For
The Top, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 177 (1997) (arguing that a two-tier residency
plan "reasonably reduces welfare incentives to migration"); Todd Zubler, The Right
to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike, 31
VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1997) (asserting that the "race to the bottom ... will only
worsen as Congress devolves power to the states").
A durational residency requirement is multi-tiered if it calculates a new resident's benefits based on the amount of benefits the applicant received from their
former state residence. Thus, assuming every state pays a different level of welfare
benefits, and groups of residents from every other state migrate to State X, State X
could conceivably have fifty distinct "tiers" of welfare beneficiaries. See Maldonado,
177 F.R.D. at 316.
9 See generally Clark Allen Peterson, Comment, The Resurgence of Durational
Residence Requirements for the Receipt of Welfare Funds, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 305,
336-39 (1993) (noting resurgence of durational residency requirements in the late
1980's to the early 1990's).
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multi-tier durational residency requirements, permissible under
PRWORA, are unconstitutional denials of equal protection.
I.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Shapiro Trilogy: Strict Scrutiny of The Fundamental
Right to Travel
1.

Shapiro v. Thompson
In Shapiro, the Court affirmed three district court decisions

holding unconstitutional state or District of Columbia statutes
that denied AFDC benefits to new residents based on failure to
meet durational residency requirements.'0 The statutes at issue
completely denied AFDC benefits to certain residents who did
not reside in the state or District of Columbia for at least one
year immediately preceding their applications for assistance.1
'0 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1969).
" See id.at 622. The Connecticut statute provided:
When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for
the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under
chapter 301 or general assistance under part I of chapter 308 within one
year from his arrival, such person shall be eligible only for temporary aid
or care until arrangements are made for his return, provided ineligibility
for aid to dependent children shall not continue beyond the maximum federal residence requirement.
Id. at 624 n.2 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-2c (1967) (repealed 1969). There
was an exception to the residency requirement for those entering the state with a
"bona fide job offer or [who] are self-supporting upon arrival.., and for three
months thereafter." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 622 n.2 (citing CONN. WELFARE MANUEL,
c. II §§ 219.1-219.2 (1966)).
The District of Columbia statute provided:
Public assistance shall be awarded to or on behalf of any needy individual
who either (a) has resided in the District for one year immediately preceding the date of filing his application for such assistance; or (b) who was
born within one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, if
the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in the
District for one year immediately preceding the birth; or (c) is otherwise
within one of the categories of public assistance established by this chapter.
Id. at 624 n.3 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1967) (repealed 1969)).
The Pennsylvania statute provided:
Assistance may be granted only to or in behalf of a person residing in
Pennsylvania who (i) has resided therein for at least one year immediately
preceding the date of application; (ii) last resided in a state which, by law,
regulation or reciprocal agreement with Pennsylvania, grants public assistance to or in behalf of a person who has resided in such state for less than
one year; (iii) is a married woman residing with a husband who meets the
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The Court held that by creating "two classes of needy resident
families indistinguishable from each other" other than their respective periods of residency in the jurisdiction, the statutes created "classification [s] which constitute[d] ... invidious discrimination denying [the applicants] equal protection of the laws."12
The Court held that because the durational residency require-

ment "touche[d] on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by [strict scrutiny] ."

requirement prescribed in subclause (i) or (ii) of this clause; or (iv) is a
child less than one year of age whose parent, or relative with whom he is
residing, meets the requirement prescribed in subclause (i), (ii) or (iii) of
this clause or resided in Pennsylvania for at least one year immediately
preceding the child's birth. Needy persons who do not meet any of the requirements stated in this clause and who are transients or without residence in any state, may be granted assistance in accordance with rules,
regulations, and standards established by the department.
Id. at 626 n.5 (quoting 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 432(6) (1968) (repealed 1969)).
12 Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 627.
13 Id.
at 638. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan expressed particular disfavor with the following proposition: "I think this branch of the 'compelling interest'
doctrine particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule.
Virtually every state statute affects important rights." Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal ProtectionDecisions:Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 100002 (1975) (using hypotheticals to show the potential expansion of Shapiro); Zubler,
supra note 8, at 899-901 (asserting that Harlan's dissent identifies a major flaw in
Shapiro:the lack of guidance as to what constitutes a penalty).
Shapirowas not the first case to employ the fimdamental rights strand of equal
protection. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right
of access to courts); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(fundamental right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (fundamental right
to criminal appeals). See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1972) (listing the interests identified as "fundamental" during the Supreme Court's term and hypothosizing as to new frontiers for this classification).
This strand of equal protection differs from the normal application of the clause because it focuses on the right being deprived rather than the class of persons being
discriminated against. See id. at 10. Although commentators felt that the Court
would expand its fundamental rights approach to include the basic necessities of life
and education, such expectations failed. See, e.g. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 137 (1973) (holding there is no fundamental right to an education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (stating that there is no fundamental right to a minimum level of housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
484 (1970) (holding that there is no fundamental right to a minimum of welfare
benefits). For a rare modern application of the fundamental rights strand of equal
protection, see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 517 U.S. 1118 (1996) (applying a fundamental right
of access to courts, equal protection analysis to require the state to provide a court
transcript to an indigent mother in a parental rights termination proceeding).
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Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, emphasized that
the Court had long recognized the right to travel as a right "
'fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.'

""4

Although

the Court explicitly specified that it had "no occasion to ascribe
the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision," 5 the Court cited several cases in which it
had attributed the right to various constitutional provisions.'
The Court then applied strict scrutiny, explaining that any classification that serves to penalize the constitutional right to interstate migration is unconstitutional unless it is "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."17 The
Court found that all of the states' asserted interests were either
constitutionally impermissible or not compelling enough to withstand strict scrutiny. Notably, the Court held that the legislative purposes of "deterrence of indigents from migrating to the
State [and] limitation of welfare benefits to those regarded as
contributing [tax money] to the State" were not "constitutionally
permissible state objective(s)." 8 Thus, such objectives would not
be constitutional under any circumstances, notwithstanding the
level of scrutiny applied by the Court. The Court also held that
the states' asserted interest in encouraging new residents to join

'4 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966)).
15 Id. at 630.

6 See id. at 630 n.8 (citing cases basing the right to travel on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause (also known as the Comity Clause)).
It is important to note that the Court failed to distinguish between the right to
travel and the right to interstate migration. Although often discussed in tandem,
the two rights have different applications: the former encompassing the right to
leave one state to establish residence in another, and the latter encompassing the
right to travel into and through another state with no intention of establishing permanent residence. See Zubler, supra note 8, at 896. Courts and commentators alike
have asserted that Justice Brennan's failure to distinguish these rights has contributed to the doctrinal uncertainty surrounding Shapiro.See Maldonado v. Houstoun,
177 F.R.D. 311, 324 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court, in Shapiro, made
no distinction between the right to travel and the right to interstate migration, despite the fact that these two rights are not identical."); Zubler, supra note 8, at 896.
'7Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (citations omitted). Scholars have criticized the
Court for applying the fundamental rights strand of Equal Protection doctrine instead of substantive due process analysis once it determined that the statutes burdened a fundamental right. See, e.g., Zubler, supra note 8, at 896-900.
'8 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633. The Court held that the states' interests in facilitating the planning of their welfare budgets, determining bona fide residence in their
jurisdictions, and preventing fraudulent claims did not pass strict scrutiny. See "d.
at 634-38.
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the work force was not even rationally related to the imposition
of a one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits. 9 Although the Court made this determination under heightened review, its broad language suggests that this objective cannot justify a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits
under any level of scrutiny.
2.

Dunn v. Blumstein
The Court had occasion to revisit durational residency requirements in a different context in Dunn v. Blumstein.0 In
Dunn, the Court affirmed a district court decision invalidating
durational residency requirements imposed as prerequisites for
registration to vote in Tennessee. 21 The Court based its application of strict scrutiny on two grounds: (1) that the Tennessee
statute deprived the migrant residents of their right to vote,22
and (2) that the durational residency requirement "directly impinge[d]" upon the migrant residents' fundamental right to
travel.' The Court found that although Tennessee's asserted interests of "insur[ing] purity of [the] ballot box" and providing
surety that those voting would be "knowledgeable voter[s]" '
were not unconstitutional per se, the statute in question was neither narrowly tailored to those interests, nor necessary to further compelling state interests.u
'9 See id. at 637-38.
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
21Id. at 332-33. The statutes in question limited voting rights in elections for
members of the general assembly and other civil officers, and registration rights for
general elections to those residents who had lived in the State of Tennessee for
twelve months prior to their application for voter registration. See id. at 332 n.1
(citations omitted).
See id. at 334-35.
2Id.
at 338. The Court cited Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S.
621, 626-30 (1969), for the proposition that state statutes "distributing the franchise" are subject to strict scrutiny. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337; see also Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding a "poll tax" violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
It is unclear why the Court chose to assert the arguably less established right
to travel rationale as additional grounds for strict scrutiny, though the Court may
have been motivated by Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion. See Dunn, 405
U.S. at 363-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that "lilt is no more a denial of
equal protection for a State to require newcomers ...[to wait] a reasonable period
such as one year before voting, than it is to require children to wait 18 years before
20

Dunn, 405 U.S. at 345.
"See id. at 360 (noting the tenuous relationship between the state's interest in

24
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Dunn clarified the Court's Shapiro holding in one important
manner. The Dunn Court rejected the state's claim that the durational residency requirements in question did not penalize the
right to interstate migration because they were not likely to deter travel." Thus, the Court found that durational residency requirements constituted penalties on the right to travel whether
or not2 7 the statute in question actually deterred interstate
travel.
3.

MemorialHospital v. Maricopa County
The Court continued its assault on durational residency requirements in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.2 In
Maricopa, the Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's
holding that county hospitals could permissibly limit nonemergency medical care and hospitalization to those indigents
who had resided in the county for one-year prior to seeking
treatment. The Court, following its rationale in Shapiro and
Dunn, found that the durational residency requirement penalized the indigent resident's right to interstate travel." Although
the Court noted that Shapiro did not determine that all durational residency requirements were per se unconstitutional,3' the
Court failed to offer any guidance as to what level of interference
with the right to interstate migration would constitute a penalty. 2 Instead, the Court held that, as in Shapiro, the durational
residency requirement created an " 'invidious classification,'
having informed voters and a fixed durational residency requirement).
S26 See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Recent Decisions: Equal Protection:DurationalResidency Requirementsfor Voting, 86 HARV. L. REV.104, 113 (1972).
27 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 339-40.
28 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
2Id.
at 252-53. Arizona law mandated that each county provide hospitalization
and non-emergency care to their indigent sick. See id. at 252. To be eligible for free
non-emergency medical care, however, the indigent must have been a resident of
the county during the preceding twelve months. See id. (citations omitted).
3"See id. at 256-62.
31 See id. at 256-57 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21).

"See id. at 284-85 (Rehmquist, J., dissenting). Unlike Shapiro, the Court recognized the difference between the right to travel and the right to interstate migration. See id. at 255 ("[The right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in
Shapiro. The Court was there concerned only with the right to migrate, 'with intent
to settle and abide' or, as the Court put it, 'to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and
start a new life.' ") (citation omitted). Once again, however, the Court neglected to
discuss whether the two rights have distinct origins and whether the Court's analysis applied to both rights.
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which deprived newcomers to the state of" 'the basic necessities
of life.' , The Court rejected the State's assertion that Shapiro
could be distinguished because while Shapiro involved a total
denial of benefits, Arizona counties still provided some level of
care to its indigent newcomers. 4 Thus, the Court implied that
the challenged durational residency need not result in the complete denial of a benefit in order to constitute a penalty on the
right to interstate migration.
Taken together, the Shapiro trilogy of cases establishes that
strict scrutiny applies to any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the right to interstate migration. At this
point, the Court did not limit this analysis to cases in which
there were deprivations of fundamental rights or the basic necessities of life. Other than providing these specific examples of
what constitutes a penalty, the trilogy provides little guidance
for future cases.
B. Starns, Sturgis, Martinez & Sosna: Residency Requirements
"ofa Different Stripe"
1. In-State Tuition cases: Starns and Sturgis
In Starns v. Malkerson"5 and Sturgis v. Washington," the

Court summarily affirmed district court opinions upholding the
constitutionality of state statutes that restricted eligibility for
reduced in-state higher education tuition fees to those students
who had resided in the jurisdiction for one year. 7 In both cases,
the lower courts distinguished Shapiro on the grounds that
higher education is not "[a] basic necessit[y] of life."38 The courts
"Id.
at 269.
4 The Arizona

statute's durational residency requirement did not apply to
.emergency cases when immediate hospitalization or medical care is necessary for
the preservation of life or limb." Id. at 252 n.2 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11297A (Supp. 1973-74)).
401 U.S. 985 (1971) (mem.).
36414 U.S. 1057 (1973) (mem.).
37 See Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973)
(sustaining the
Washington statute's one-year residency requirement to qualify for in-state tuition),
affd mem., 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.
1970) (sustaining the Minnesota Board of Regents residency requirement for instate tuition), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
3"See Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 41; Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238. The Starns court
also distinguished Shapiro on grounds that the statute in Shapiro was specifically
intended to discourage interstate migration, whereas there was neither evidence of
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thus applied a rational basis review and found that the distinctions created by the statutes bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 9
It is important to note that the Court has held that
"summary affirmance... is not to be read as an adoption of the
reasoning supporting the [lower court's] judgment under review."4" Thus, while the Court affirmed the judgments in Starns
and Sturgis, it did not necessarily agree with the rationale of the
courts below. Indeed, although Starns explicitly stated that the
primary purpose of Minnesota's durational residency requirement was "to achieve partial cost equalization between those
who have and those who have not recently contributed to the
State's economy through employment, tax payments and expenditures therein," 4 the Court considered the durational residency
requirement in Starns as a legitimate test for bona fide residency.42
such intent, nor of such deterrence in the Minnesota Board of Regents decision. Id.
at 237-38. The Court summarily affirmed this case prior to deciding Dunn v. Blumstein wherein the Court held that intent to deter and actual deterrence of the right
to travel are not prerequisites for triggering strict scrutiny. See Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, at 339-40; supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
The Sturgis court's attempt to distinguish higher education from the basic necessities of life implied that the court believed that the latter was a fundamental
right. See Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 41 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)) The Sturgis Court concluded 'that this [was] not a
case of infringement of a fundamental right and therefore h[e]ld that the exacting
standards of the compelling state interest test are not here applicable." Id. This
conclusion, although perhaps implicit in the Shapiro decision, did not prove to be
true. See supra note 13.
39 See Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 41 (defining the issue as whether "there [is] a rational, reasonable, relevant distinction between the differentiated classes"); Starns,
326 F. Supp. at 240-41.
40 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982); see also Colorado Springs
Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 920-21 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that a summary disposition is binding in a subsequent case only insofar
as when the issue raised in the two cases are identical); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419
U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (explaining that summary affirmance
denotes the agreement with the lower court's disposition of a case, but not necessarily with that court's reasoning); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974)
(noting that a judgment on the merits is entitled to greater precedential value than
a summary affirmance).
41 Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 240; accordSturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 41 (asserting that
the waiting period facilitates the implementation of a "partial cost equalization").
42 See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64 n.13 ("Moreover... we considered the Minnesota
one-year residency requirement examined in Starns a test of bona fide residence,
not a return on prior contributions to the commonweal[th."); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 452-53 n.9 (1973) (distinguishing Starns on grounds that under the Min-
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2.

Martinez v. Bynum: Bona Fide Residency Requirements
The Court analyzed the constitutionality of a purported test
for bona fide residency in Martinez v. Bynum. 43 Martinez concerned a Texas education law that denied free public school education to any "minor who lives apart from a 'parent, guardian or
other person having lawful control of him under an order of a
court' if his presence in the school district is 'for the primary
purpose of attending the public free schools.' "" The Court applied a rational basis review to the statute and held that "bona
fide residence requirement[s], appropriately defined and uniformly applied, further[ the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by
residents."45 The Court noted that such requirements "do[] not
burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate
travel... [because] any person is free to move to a State and to
establish residence there."46
The Court asserted that a residency requirement is appronesota statute, the durational residency requirement "was merely one element
which Minnesota required to demonstrate bona fide domicile"). In Vandis, the
Court struck down a Connecticut statute that created an "irrebuttable presumption"
that out-of-state students at Connecticut State Universities could not be considered
state residents for purposes of paying lower in-state tuition. Id. at 454. The Court
held that Connecticut's irrebuttable presumption that out-of-state resident attendees of the University would not establish permanent residency in Connecticut
within four years violated the students' right to procedural due process. See id. at
454. Because the Court focused on procedural due process rather than equal protection, Vlandis does not add much to the Shapiro trilogy. It does, however, indicate
that the Court viewed Starns as a bona fide residency case. For a discussion of the
"brief and troubled life of 'irrebuttable presumptions,' " see generally GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 914-16 (13th ed. 1997)
(discussing criticism of the irrebuttable presumptions mode of analysis and its ultimate fall from grace in Supreme Court jurisprudence) (internal citations omitted).
461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983).
" Id. at 323, 323 n.2 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(a) (West 1997)).
'sId.at 328; see also id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming that Court
held that where a statute "imposes a bona fide residence requirement in a uniform
fashion, it is ipso facto constitutional").
The Court also asserted that because of the traditional importance of local control over schools, the state has an interest in insuring that only bona fide residents
may attend tuition-free. See id. at 329-30 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
741-42 (1973)). But see id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the right
to education is fundamental and that because the statute in issue impeded this fimdamental right, strict scrutiny should apply).
46 Id. at 328-29.
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priately defined if it requires those seeking residency "to live in
the district with a bona fide intention of remaining there." 7 The
Court held that the residency requirement in the Texas statute
comported with these "traditional, basic residence criteria."48
3. Sosna: Ad Hoc Balancing or Non-Penalty Residency
Requirements?
Sosna v. Iowa49 was the first post-Shapiro case in which the
Court issued an opinion upholding a durational residency requirement. In Sosna, the Court upheld an Iowa statute that required residents to fulfill a one-year residency requirement prior
to seeking a divorce.
Although the proper analysis under
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa would arguably have been to determine whether the durational residency requirement penalized
the new resident's right to interstate travel by denying her the
right to file for divorce," the Court followed a different path.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, proceeded to distinguish the Iowa statute from Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa on the
grounds that the statute restricted the resident's ability to file
for a divorce only temporarily, and was "justified on grounds
other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative
convenience.""i
Although the Court did not apply the Shapiro analysis in
traditional fashion, and critics have dismissed Sosna as an example of "ad hoc balancing,"52 Sosna can be understood within
the framework provided by Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa. Justice Rehnquist asserted that although the restriction on residents' benefits or rights in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa lasted

47Id. at 332.
48

id.

49 419 U.S.

393 (1975).

See id. at 418-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that a classification
which impinges upon the right to interstate travel must be supported by a compelling qovernmental interest in order to be valid).
$ Id. at 406. Iowa asserted that the durational residency requirements were
necessary because of the importance of the issues at stake (i.e. child support, property rights), to protect its interest in preventing itself from becoming a "divorce
mill," and to provide a safeguard against collateral attack against its divorce decrees
from other states. See id. at 406-09.
62 Id.
at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming that under the majority's approach, "the State's putative interest in ensuring that its divorce petitioners establish some roots in Iowa is said to justify the one-year residency requirement"); see
also Zubler, supra note 8, at 905 ("Sosna is probably best viewed as sui generis.").
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only temporarily, the benefits or rights forgone during the period
of restriction were permanently lost. 3 In Sosna, as the Court
states, the right to file for a divorce is only temporarily restricted; the resident's right to seek a divorce is completely restored once she has fulfilled the durational residency requirement.'
Viewed in the context of Shapiro's penalty analysis,
Sosna makes a distinction, albeit implicitly, that, in some circumstances, a temporary deprivation of a right may not rise to
the level of a penalty.55 Because the durational residency requirement in question does not constitute a penalty, rational
basis is the appropriate standard.
When analyzed individually, the in-state tuition and divorce
cases do not add much to the Shapiro trilogy. The in-state tuition cases lack precedential value and the Court has limited
their scope. They are best viewed, along with Martinez, as examples of valid tests for bona fide residency. Sosna may or may
not provide guidance as to what constitutes a penalty, or, as
Justice Marshall feared, may signal the Court's reluctance to
apply the Shapiro penalty rationale in durational residency requirement cases."
When viewed as a group, however, this body of case law certainly suggests the Court's unwillingness to expand the Shapiro
trilogy's penalty analysis. Though the Court has ruled that education is not a fundamental right, it has stated that it is an
"important interest."5 7 Thus, a test for bona fide residency is pre"' See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406. To take the least obvious example, the resident in
Dunn would be forced to forgo his right to vote in all elections during the one-year
durational residency period. Although he would be able to vote in subsequent elections, he would not and could not regain his right to vote in the prior elections at the
end of the one year period.
'" Id. (stating that "Iowa's [divorce residency] requirement delayed [the appellant's] access to the courts, but, by fulfilling it, she could ultimately have obtained
the same opportunity for adjudication which she asserts ought to have been hers at
an earlier point in time").
Admittedly, this analysis infers much from the scant language in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. However, the Court has yet to define any specific criteria for
what constitutes a penalty, and has not decided any case concerning durational
residency requirements since Sosna.
s6See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am concerned not
only about the disposition of this case, but also about the implications of the majority's analysis ... for durational residency requirement cases in general.").
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 778 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that there is an important interest in maintaining local autonomy over educational decisions); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30, 35
(1973) (observing that although education is not a fundamental right, it is an impor-
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sumptively valid even where important interests are involved.
Moreover, the Court has never held that the right to divorce
is a fundamental right. In Boddie v. Connecticut," however, the
Court recognized that divorce is closely related to marriage and
procreation, which do merit a higher level of scrutiny.5 9 Thus, it
seems apparent that the Court will only apply its penalty analysis to durational residency requirements that hinder fundamental rights or the basic necessities of life.
C. The Rehnquist CourtApplies the Brakes to Right to Travel
Analysis in Zobel, Hooper, & Soto-Lopez
1.

Zobel v. Williams
In Zobel v. Williams," the Court held unconstitutional an
Alaska statutory scheme that distributed income from its petroleum reserves to its citizens in varying amounts based on each
citizen's period of residence within the state. 1 The Court noted
tant one, which is vital to free society) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972)); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating that "education is'
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments").
58401 U.S. 371 (1971).
9 See id. at 374 (holding that because of the importance of marriage in "society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying...
access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriage");
see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (finding that the fundamental
right of economically poor people to marry can be statutorily impinged upon, if the
statute effectuates only sufficiently important state interests); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a statute prohibiting married people
from using contraceptives pursuant to a fundamental rights/strict scrutiny analysis); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding a Virginia anti-miscegenation
statute unconstitutional due to its failure to satisfy the "'most rigid scrutiny' " under the Fourteenth Amendment) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944)); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "strict
scrutiny of the classification which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential,
lest.., invidious discriminations are made.., in violation of the constitutional
guaranty of just and equal laws").
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
61 See id. at 56. The statute divided Alaska's petroleum reserve fund into units
of $50. Each resident would get annual payment composed of one unit per year for
each year that they lived in the state. Thus, a ten year resident would get $500 per
year, whereas a two year resident would only get $100 per year. See id. at 57.
The Court confronted a similar situation and reached similar results on different grounds in the context of a state tax use law. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S.
14 (1985). In Williams, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a state to
grant its residents a tax credit for sales tax paid in a different state when purchasing of a car there, but denying that same benefit to similarly situated non-residents.
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that, like Shapiro, the Alaska statutory scheme "involve[d] distinctions between residents based on when they arrived in the
[s]tate."62 The Court distinguished Alaska's scheme from the
Shapiro line of cases, however, by noting that the statutory
scheme "creates fixed, permanent distinctions between...
classes of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they
have been in the [s]tate."' Presumably because of this distinction, the Court did not consider whether the scheme constituted
a penalty on the right to travel, subject to strict scrutiny under
Shapiro.6 Instead, the Court held that the scheme failed to pass
even rational basis review. 65
Alaska asserted three objectives in support of the classification scheme. The Court held that the first two objectives,
"creating a financial incentive for individuals to establish and
maintain Alaska residence, and assuring prudent management
of the [petroleum reserves] [flund" were not rationally related to
the distinctions the scheme created between older and newer
residents of the state. 6 The Court's analysis of these two objectives, however, did not comport with traditional rational basis
equal protection review.67 Instead of according deference to the
state's purported objectives, the Court scrutinized the fit between the state's interests and the classification it created.
Thus, although the Court purported to apply rational basis review, its standard is more akin to rational basis with a bite.'
Id. at 28. The argument that the statute unlawfully impinged upon the right to
travel was not reached. See id. at 27. Instead, the case was resolved on the grounds
that the statute was facially discriminatory. See id. at 28.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6.
63 Id. at 59.
4See
id. at 60 n.6. The Court noted "[iun reality, right to travel analysis refers
to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis." Id.
"See id. at 65 (concluding that "Alaska has shown no valid state interests
which are rationally served by the distinction it makes between citizens" based on
when the citizen established residency in Alaska).
6 Id. at 61.
67 See id. at 82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court seems
to depart
from the "highly deferential approach" it usually takes towards economic regulations); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1707 n.80 (1984) ("[In rationality review under the equal protection clause...
the examination of whether a rational basis exists for a classification serves largely
as a check on illegitimate motivations;... the test is deferential because it is
adopted when there is no reason to suspect that an illegitimate motivation is at
work.") (internal citations omitted).
65 See Sunstein, supra note 67, at 1713 n.117 (citing Zobel as "one
of the few
cases in which the Court has invalidated a statute on rationality grounds"); cf
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The Court, citing Shapiro, declared unconstitutional
Alaska's third stated objective, to "reward citizens for past contributions."69 Thus, according to the broad language of the Court,
this objective is under no circumstances "a legitimate state purpose."" Justice O'Connor, concurring, and Justice71 Rehnquist,
dissenting, took extreme exception to this viewpoint.
The four opinions in Zobel provide clear evidence of the
Court's fractured view of right to travel cases. Justice Brennan
concurred, but would have decided the cases in the same fashion
as Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa-a classification "where the
'right to travel' [was] involved... [thereby] trigger[ing] intensified equal protection scrutiny."72 He also reiterated his belief
that the Court need not ground the right to travel in any specific
constitutional provision.73 Justice O'Connor also concurred in
the judgment, but would have "measure[d] Alaska's scheme
against the principles... [of] the Privileges and Immunities [(or
Comity)] Clause."74 Finally, Justice Rehnquist dissented, agreeing with the majority that rational basis was the appropriate
standard of review, but disagreeing with the Court's modified
application of that standard.75
2.

Hooper v. Bernadillo County Assessor
In Hooper,76 the Court declared unconstitutional a New

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996) (purporting to apply a rational basis
review to a classification scheme, yet striking down Colorado referendum).
9 Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63-64 (raising the concern that "Alaska's reasoning could

open the door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency").
70Id. at 63 (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 449-50, 450 n.6 (1973); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969)).
71See id.. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the Equal Protection
Clause does not render this purpose impermissible); see also id at 83 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Court has only found this interest impermissible when
applying strict scrutiny in travel cases).
Id. at 66 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan asserted that the "right [to
travel]-or, more precisely, the federal interest in free interstate migration-is
clearly, though indirectly, affected by the Alaska dividend-distribution law, and this
threat to free interstate migration provides an independent rationale for holding
that law unconstitutional". Id. at 66.
73See id. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that such a statutory scheme
as that adopted by Alaska is "inconsistent with the federal structure even in its prospective operation") (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630).
74Id. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7 See id. at 82-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76472 U.S. 612 (1985).
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Mexico statute that provided annual property tax exemptions to
any resident Vietnam War veteran who had resided in the State
prior to May 8, 1976. 7' The Court applied rational basis (with a
bite) as the standard of review and held that the statute's stated
objectives were not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose.78 Once again, the Court decided to forgo a
Shapiro fundamental right to travel equal protection analysis.
The Court clarified its rationale for doing so by distinguishing
between right to travel cases, which " 'examine[], in equal protection terms, state distinctions between newcomers and longer
term residents,' ",7 and cases like Zobel and Hooper which do not
invoke the right to travel, but examine, in equal protection
terms, permanent, fixed" 'distinction[s] between residents based
on when they first established residence in the State.' "8 Thus,
it seemed after Zobel and Hooper that the Court would only apply the Shapiro penalty analysis in cases involving durational
residency requirements in which the state creates temporary
distinctions between newer and older residents.
3.

Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez

In Soto-Lopez8 1 the Court failed to follow the rationale of
Zobel and Hooper. Soto-Lopez involved a New York statutory
scheme which provided civil service employment preferences to
honorably discharged United States army veterans who were
New York residents when they entered military service.8 2 Although a majority of the Court voted to strike the statute down,
there was no consensus as to the appropriate standard of review.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion applied the Shapiro
penalty analysis.'
The Court emphasized that although the
benefits, namely civil service employment preference bonus
points, "may not rise to the same level of importance as the ne-

78

See id. at 614, 616.
See id. at 621-23 (citing Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63).

79 Id. at 618 n.6 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6).

go Id. (following Zobel in applying an equal protection analysis).
8' 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality).
"2 Id. at 900. Those residents who were New York residents when they joined
military service were awarded "bonus points," which were added to their civil service test scores. See id. Thus, like the classifications in Zobel and Hooper, the classification between residents was fixed and permanent. See id.
See id. at 910 (stating that New York could accomplish its goal by allowing
special credits to all qualified veterans, rather than requiring a prior residence requirement).
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cessities of life and the right to vote," such benefits were significant." Because the statute operated to permanently deprive
some residents of these significant benefits, "based only on the
fact of nonresidence at a past point in time," the plurality concluded it constituted a penalty on the right to interstate migration.' The plurality then found that New York failed to meet "its
heavy burden of proving that it ha[d] selected a means of pursuing a compelling state interest which does not impinge unnecessarily on" the right to interstate migration.6
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result, but asserted
that the Court, under Zobel and Hooper, should have first determined whether the statute passed rational basis review before
it addressed whether the statute penalized the right to interstate
migration.87 He argued that the New York statutory scheme was
very similar to the scheme the Court struck down in Hooper, and
proceeded to apply a similar analysis with analogous results.'
Justice O'Connor dissented and again asserted that the
Comity Clause should have governed the case at bar.89 She further argued that whether the Court applied Shapiro's right to
migrate penalty analysis, the rational basis review of Zobel and
Hooper, or the Comity Clause, the case did not warrant heightened scrutiny because public employment is not a significant
enough interest.0
Although the plurality opinion garnered the most votes with
four, it is highly questionable whether the Court will apply the
Shapiro penalty analysis to similar cases in the future. A majority of the Justices favored some form of review other than the
Id. at 908 (suggesting that although the issue of bonus points does not rise to
the level of strict scrutiny, it does necessitate a heightened standard of review).
Id. at 909 (noting that the veterans who failed to qualify under the statute are
"permanently" deprived of credits).
' Id. at 911. The plurality stated that a state may not discriminate against a
resident solely on the basis of when they arrived in the state. See id. (citing Hooper,
472 U.S. at 623).
"7 See id. at 912-13 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that the analysis ends
once a statute fails the rationality test).
88 See id. Justice White joined Chief Justice Burger's concurrence and opined
that the right to travel was not sufficiently implicated to require heightened scrutiny. See id. at 916,
See id. at 918 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent and filed a brief dissent of his own. See id. at 916 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's dissent. See id. at 918.
90 See id. at 925 (stating that the issue of public employment has a minimal effect, and something more is needed to trigger heightened scrutiny).
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penalty analysis, and none of the plurality Justices remain on
the Court.9 Therefore, a safer assumption is that the Court will
apply the right to travel penalty analysis only in cases where
residency distinctions affect a fundamental right, such as access
to the ballot, or the basic necessities of life. In all other cases involving permanent class distinctions between newer and older
residents based on the duration of residence within the state, it
is likely that the Court will not implicate the right to travel, and
thus, apply some form of rational basis scrutiny. Of course,
there is also the question of whether the present Court will seek
to establish a constitutional basis for the fundamental right to
travel.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR THE RIGHT TO
INTERSTATE MIGRATION'
A.

Justice Brennan's StructuralApproach

The failure to ground the fundamental right to travel in a
specific constitutional provision, or set of provisions, has been a
major criticism of the Shapiro line of cases.9" In Shapiro,Justice
Brennan wrote "[w]e have no occasion to ascribe the source of
this right.., to a particular constitutional provision."94 Brennan
9' See William Cohen, DiscriminationAgainst New State Citizens: An Update,
11 CONST. COMMENTARY 73 (1994) (describing the potential impact new Supreme
Court Justices will have on the right to travel issue). Professor Cohen notes that the
only three Justices-White, Brennan and Marshall-who were in the majority in all
cases striking down discrimination cases, no longer sit on the Court. See id. at 78.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has always voted to uphold state regulations, three other
Justices have "dissented in one, two, or all three of the most recent cases," and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Souter have not participated in any
Supreme Court decisions touching upon the issue of discrimination against new citizens. Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted). Since Professor Cohen's article, Justice Breyer
has replaced Justice Blackmun, who was the in the majority in two of the three
cases.
92 The subject of the constitutional grounds for the right to travel is vast enough
to warrant an entire paper, or perhaps a book. Although the source of the right is
somewhat outside of the scope of this paper, in recognition of the current Court's
apparent fetish with textual interpretation, this paper will merely sketch out the
major constitutional provisions that members of the Court and constitutional scholars have asserted as grounds for the right to travel.
9See
e.g., Zubler, supra note 8, at 895-901 (discussing a need for clarification
and correction in right to travel jurisprudence).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969); see also United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-758 (1966) (stating that the right to travel is fundamental
to our federal system and has been recognized numerous times).
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later opined that "the frequent attempts to assign the right to
travel some textual source in the Constitution seem to me to
have proved both inconclusive and unnecessary."" Ultimately,
however, Justice Brennan seemed to believe that the very structure and purpose of the Constitution itself formed the basis for
the right. He found "its unmistakable essence in that document
that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation." 6 Thus, he believed that the right is fundamental to the
document that created our nation.
B. Justice O'Connor'sApproach: The Comity Clause
Justice O'Connor has repeatedly asserted her belief that the

right to travel is grounded in Article Four's Privileges and Immunities Clause,97 also known as the Comity Clause." At least
one active member of the Court has expressly rejected
O'Connor's approach.99 The main criticism of finding the source
of the right to travel in the Comity Clause is that the Clause

applies only to the right to travel, but not the right to interstate
migration.0 0 Thus, the Clause protects a citizen of State A from
being denied rights by State B, but does nothing for Citizen A
when it is State A that denies him rights.'0 ' Justice O'Connor
rejected this criticism,
however, implying that it was merely a
0 2
technical distinction.
95Zobel, 457 U.S. at 66 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 67. Justice Brennan went on to state that with the adoption of the
Equal Protection Clause, discrimination based upon length of residency was implicitly rejected. See id. at 71.
9""The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1.
'sSee Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 918-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zobel, 457 U.S.
at 71-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally Raoul Berger, Residence Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 853, 863 (1981)
(asserting the Comity Clause as a textual source of the right to travel).
99 See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the clause is
for the benefit of nonresidents, and has no application by a citizen who questions his
resident state's laws).
'0oSee id. (opining that the Privilege and Immunity Clause is not a provision
whereby the federal government may regulate the way in which the states controlled their citizens).
10' See id. at 84 n.3 (concluding that the "[cilause assures that nonresidents of a
State shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as residents enjoy").
'
See id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that a scheme which
treats a citizen who moves to state A differently from a citizen who already resides
there violates the clause) (citing Note, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privilegesand Immunities Clause of Arti-
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C. The FourteenthAmendment
1.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States."1 °3 Although judges and commentators have
asserted this clause as a source of the right to travel and the
right to interstate migration,0 the Slaughter-House Cases1"5 basically eviscerated this clause by holding that it only protected
citizens from state interference with the privileges or immunities
of national citizenship.0 '
2.

The Citizenship Clause
The Citizenship Clause provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."1"7 In his concurring opinion in Zobel, Justice Brennan argued that the "[Citizenship] Clause does not
provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based

cle IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461, 1464-65 n.17 (1979)). Justice O'Connor has articulated her approach as follows: First the Court should determine whether the state is
engaging in discrimination that burdens an" 'essential activity or [the] exercise [of]
a basic right'" of the non-resident. Id. at 76 (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish and
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978)). If so, the state action will only be valid if
the state proves that the non-citizens constitute a" 'peculiar source of the evil' " at
which the discriminatory statute is aimed, and whether the statute bears a "
'substantial relationship' between the evil and the discrimination practiced against
the noncitizens." Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hicklin v.
Orbek, 437 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1978)).
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, c. 2.
104 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181, 182-85 (1941) (Douglas and
Jackson, JJ., concurring) (stating that the right to migration is grounded in the
Comity Clause); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) (noting that the right
to interstate travel is one of the privileges of national citizenship). See generally
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385 (1992) (discussing the applicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the distinction between substantive and equity-based constitutional limitations).
'o5
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
106 See Zubler, supra note 8, at 917 (suggesting that although the SlaughterHouse Cases may have been wrongly decided, such a longstanding precedent is unlikely to be overruled).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 1.
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on length of residence."' Other scholars have interpreted this
clause to mean that "it is unconstitutional to deny benefits to
new citizens that are extended to other citizens similarly situated-subject only to reasonable assurances that claims of new
residence are bona fide." 1 9
The Equal Protection Clause: Newcomers as a Suspect Class
Some commentators have argued that newcomers should be
considered a suspect class and that strict scrutiny should apply
to class distinctions based on duration of residency." ° This view
arguably finds some support in the heightened rational basis
review of Zobel and Hooper. However, newcomers, as a class,
fail to meet the traditional criteria for identification as a suspect
class."' Although they are typically a minority, they are by no
means "discrete and insular."" It may be argued, however, that
newcomers, by virtue of their lack of presence in the jurisdiction,
are shut out of the political processes that would otherwise tend
to protect them from discrimination.'
3.

'08 Zobel, 457 U.S. at 69, 69 n.2 (implying that the contrary view would be consistent with aristocracy); see Richard Rutland, Virginia Declarationof Rights (1776),
in THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, app. A (1955) (stating that a citizen is not entitled to exclusive or separate privileges).
'09
William Cohen, DiscriminationAgainst New State Citizens: An Update, 11

CONST. COMMENTARY, 73, 79 (1994) (concluding that it would also be unconstitutional to treat citizens as state residents in theory but not in practice).
"o See generally Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal ProtectionDecisions -Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987,
1016-23 (1975). McCoy argues that even though the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to protect black citizens, the Supreme Court has applied a broad interpretation of the amendment and created a suspect class whenever the disadvantaged
class "occupies the same position with respect to state government as that occupied
by blacks". Id. at 1017.
m See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112 Id.
'" See id. Although the newcomers presumably had the ability to vote in their
state of origin, they do not have the ability to participate in the political processes
that deny them the right asserted, by virtue of their absence in the state at the time
of enactment of the durational residency requirement.
Suspect class equal protection analysis would only provide constitutional guidance for durational residency requirement right to travel cases. In Zobel, Hooper,
and Soto-Lopez, the class distinctions were based on residents' duration or timing of
residency within the state, rather than recent migration into the state. For instance,
in Zobel a resident of twenty years within the state received a greater share of the
petroleum reserve fund than a resident of ten years. Certainly the ten year resident
could not be considered a newcomer for equal protection purposes.
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III. WELFARE REFORM & THE MULTI-TIERED DURATIONAL
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

A. AFDC: Welfare as we Knew It
Congress established the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program as part of the Social Security Act of 1935
("AFDC")."4 AFDC guaranteed a minimum level of assistance in
the form of an "entitlement" to families with children who met
statutorily defined criteria."5 The program also entailed a
matching federal grant-as states increased AFDC benefits for6
families, the government increased its payment to the states."
The state programs had to be submitted to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services for approval," 7 but federal supervision was minimal."' The old statute implicitly permitted durational residency requirements," 9 but expressly prohibited durational residency requirements in excess of one year."'
"' See Zubler, supra note 8, at 926. The AFDC was established as an optional
monetary supplement to individual state programs that had residency requirements
which made it difficult for newcomers to qualify for aid. See id. Under the AFDC,
the federal government allowed states to continue to deny newcomers benefits for
one year. See id.
5 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 44-45 (recognizing that, although helpful,
AFDC benefits do not lift a family from poverty even when such benefits are coupled
with food stamps).
116See id. (noting, however, that the states choose the income qualification levels); Zubler, supra note 8, at 926-27 (pointing out that it is the states that that set
the benefit amounts). Although the AFDC program refers to a "matching" federal
grant, in fact the amount of matching varied inversely to state per capita income.
See id. at 927. Thus, in poorer states, the federal government paid a higher percentage of the benefits. See id. For example, in 1995, the federal government contributed
over seventy-eight percent of the AFDC benefits paid out in Mississippi, but only
fifty percent of those in New York. See id.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1969) (quoting the requirements set out in section 402(b) of the Social Security Act of 1935 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(b))).
"1 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 44-45; Zubler, supra note 8, at 926 (noting that
the federal government did provide minimal supervision of eligibility amounts, and
administration of grants).
" See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639 (stating that while the statute does not approve
a one-year requirement, it prohibits the federal government from approving state
durational residency plans where they include a durational residency requirement
in excess of one year). The legislative history of the Act "discloses that Congress enacted the directive to curb hardships resulting from lengthy residence requirements." Id.
12o See

42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. 604(c) (Supp. 1997). The

section provided:
The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the
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B. The PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reform
Act of 1996: Workfare as We Know it.
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton acted on his pledge to
"121
by signing into law the Personal
end "welfare as we know it
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reform Act ("PRWORA" or
"Act").' The Act replaced the AFDC entitlement program described above' with block grants of federal money to be paid to
the states.' The Act provides the states with great latitude to
spend the federal money as they wish.' Federal contributions
to state family assistance programs are now governed under the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") program.2 6
Under TANF, federal contributions to state plans are capped

conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall
not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to
families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies
aid with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in
the State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid,
or (2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application,
if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in
the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.
Id.; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639 (stating congressional intent was to "curb
hardships resulting from lengthy residence requirements.")
121 Edelman, supra note 6, at 43 (arguing that PRWORA makes
the welfare system worse than it was); see Lisa K. Garfinkle, Two Generationsat Risk: The Implications of Welfare Reform for Teen Parentsand Their Children, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1233, 1243 (1997) (discussing background and general provisions of PRWORA).
122 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1997) (stating "Itihis [section]
shall not be interpreted
to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded
under this part"); Zubler, supra note 8,at 927.
'24 See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (paying states quarterly); Zubler, supra note 8, at 927;
see also April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the
Male Sex Right, 75 OR. L. REV. 1037, 1086 (1996) (noting that PRWORA substitutes
a block grant program for former legal entitlement of indigent families to cash and
in-kind assistance).
'2 See Edelman, supra note 6, at 49 (noting that the Act does not require the
state's welfare expenditures to be in cash); Zubler, supra note 8, at 928 (arguing
that the decentralization of welfare programs gives states "new latitude in deciding
who gets how much assistance and for how long"); cf. Cherry, supra note 124, at
1086 (noting that the state program is ultimately subject to guidelines set by the
federal government).
126 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(1996). AFDC benefits are now referred to as TANF
benefits in most state statutes. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D 311, 317 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1997). Pennsylvania refers to family assistance that are partially funded
by federal grants as "TANF benefits". Other states still refer to the benefits by their
old moniker. See Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 979 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 1997)
(pointing out that California still refers to benefits as AFDC benefits).
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27
until 2002 at the level paid to the state in 1994 under AFDC1
In order for a states to be eligible for the federal block grants,

they must not reduce their expenditures on welfare below eighty
percent of their 1994 levels.'2
Critics of PRWORA claim that the new statutory scheme
will produce a "race to the bottom" as neighboring states adopt
unattractive benefits packages to avoid becoming a "welfare
magnet."29 While there is extensive debate as to whether the
"welfare magnet" hypothesis is valid,13 ° the threat of states reacting to such fears provides some credence to the race to the bottom theory. Proponents of PRWORA point to durational residency requirements as a solution to such problems. They assert
that by employing such requirements, a state will be able to experiment with favorable benefits packages without fear of becoming a welfare magnet. 3 '
Although this philosophical debate is outside the scope of
this paper, perhaps it explains the resurgence of durational residency requirements. The Act expressly provides that states
"may apply to a family the rules (including benefit amounts) of
the program funded under this part of another State if the family has moved to the State from the other State and has resided
in the State for less than twelve months."1 2 Interestingly, there
is no mention of Shapiro, or its progeny, in the legislative history
127
128

See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1) (1996); Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 317 n.4.
See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7) (1990); Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 317 n.4.

'g See, e.g., Devolution, supra note 7, at 116-17; Edelman, supra note 6 at 52;
Alan Ebrenhalt, The Devil in Devolution, GOVERNING MAG., May 1997, at 7; cf.
Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 329 n.21 (asserting Supreme Court precedent that states
may not use durational residency requirements to avoid becoming a welfare magnet
may seem "counterintuitive on an economic level").
1 0 Compare PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE
FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (1990) (arguing that state governments will provide
lower benefits out of fear that higher benefits would attract the poor), and Peterson,
supra note 7, with F.H. Buckley & Margaret Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race For
The Top, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997) (arguing against welfare magnet hypothesis); see also Zubler, supra note 8,at 929-38 (arguing that decentralized welfare state actions will create externalities prompting a race to the bottom).
11 See generally Zubler, supra note 8, at 936-38 (arguing that multi-tier durational residency requirements are the solution to the welfare magnet and race to the
bottom dilemmas and that Shapiro "hamper[s]" welfare reform and thus should be
overrruled); see also Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public
Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 2000 (1996) (arguing, prior to the enactment of PRWORA, that a solution to the race to the bottom is a two-tiered benefit program).
132 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (Supp. 1997).
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of the Act.
C. The DurationalResidency Requirement Boom
Not surprisingly, section 604(c) has led to a proliferation of
multi-tiered durational residency requirements. At least four
states have enacted such durational residency requirements
since the passage of PRWORA,"3 and at least two other states
have implemented durational residency requirements which
limit new residents' benefits to a percentage of the state standard benefits. 3 4 Two federal district courts have already enjoined multi-tier durational residency requirements, 3 5 and at
least three other suits seeking injunctive relief have been filed in

state and federal courts.

6

The following section reviews and

critiques the manner in which courts have applied Shapiro and
its progeny to such requirements.
IV. RECENT STATE AND FEDERAL CASES DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
OF WELFARE BENEFITS
A. Jones v. Milwaukee County: Total Deprivationfor a Short
Periodof Time
In Jones,'37 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a statute
that imposed a sixty day durational residency requirement on
"dependent" persons seeking "general relief."" 8 Under the statute in question general relief included "such services, commodi11450.03 (West 1997); MINN.STAT. § 256J.43
(West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-46 (West 1997); 62 PA. CONS. STAT. § 432(5)(ii)
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-107(a) (Michie 1997).
114 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-112(b)(8) (1997)
(limiting new residents to
"

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §

"ninety per cent of the benefit level for which [they] qualifly]"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 405.1-8(e) (1997) (reducing an otherwise eligible family's cash TANF benefits "by thirty
percent... until the family has been a resident of the state for twelve... consecutive months").
"' See Part IV.D.1, infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
18 See Across The U.S.A. Newswire: Rhode Island,U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 22, 1997
(noting the challenge to Rhode Island's durational residency requirement); Patricia
Lopez, Class-Action Suit Filed To Block New State Welfare Law, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 16, 1997, at 1A (noting the challenge to Minnesota's multi-tier
durational residency requirement); Ovetta Wiggins, State's Welfare Law Challenged
'PayingNew Residents Less At Issue, STAR LEDGER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 19 (noting the
challenge to New Jersey's durational residency statute).
137485

N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 1992).

'38
Id. at 23.
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ties or money as are reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to provide food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water,
medicine, medical, dental and surgical treatment."'3 9 The state
claimed that it imposed the residency
4 requirement to encourage
new residents to join the work force.

1

The Court acknowledged the "unsettled nature" of the degree to which a durational residency requirement must impinge
upon the right to travel in order to constitute a penalty subject to
strict scrutiny analysis.'
The Court then held, rather capriciously, "that because the [sixty] day waiting period at issue here
is so substantially less onerous than the one year waiting period
of Shapiro,that it does not operate to penalize an individual's
right to travel."'42 Having determined4 such, the court then applied traditional rational basis review.

1

Although the court may have been correct concerning the
lack of guidance as to what constitutes a penalty, its analysis is
fundamentally flawed. 44 First, by focusing on the length of the
residency requirement rather than the benefits that the requirement denied, the court misinterpreted one of the Shapiro
trilogy's few clear standards regarding what constitutes a penalty. 4 ' The Wisconsin statute's definition of general relief provided a virtual laundry list of the "basic necessities of life."'46 It
is clear that under Shapiro and Maricopa, any durational residency requirement that deprives otherwise eligible residents of
the basic necessities of life solely based upon their recent entry
into the state is a penalty on the right to interstate migration.
Thus, absent evidence that the sixty day period was a bona fide
residency requirement, the court should have held that the statId. Such benefits were funded with state money. See id.
See id. at 25.
141Id. at 26.

"9

141

142Id.
143

See id. ("[W] e review the constitutionality of the statute under the traditional

equal protection analysis such that the classification will fail" if it is without rationality).
144 But cf. Zubler, supra note 8, at 907 (citing Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 26) (arguing
that the Jones decision merely reflects the Court's failure to provide standards and
the overall futility of the "penalty" analysis).
141 See Matthew Poppe, Comment, Defining the Scope of the Equal Protection
Clause With Respect to Welfare Waiting Periods,61 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 301 (1994)
("Although Jones is technically consistent with the Shapiro holding, it flies in the
face of the concerns underlying Shapiro . ..
141 See Jones, 485 N.W.2d at
23.
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ute penalized the right to interstate migration.

The Court's rational basis analysis is also arguably flawed.
The court applied the traditional, deferential standard of rational basis. 4 ' In Shapiro, the Court held that the creation of
classes of welfare recipients based on residents' period of residency within the state is not rationally related to the legitimate

state interest of encouraging new residents to enter the work
force. The Jones court upheld this interest and distinguished
Shapiro on grounds that the Shapiro Court's standard of review
was higher. Although some cases have held that the an interest
that fails the compelling interest test still may pass rational basis review, 4 9 Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez imply that a less deferential standard of review is appropriate where a state creates

classifications between its citizens based on duration of residency.
B.

50

Mitchell v. Steffen: PercentageReduction of Benefits

The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a state statute
that reduced, but did not completely deny, welfare benefits based
on an otherwise eligible needy resident's recent migration to the
state. 5 ' Minnesota's welfare statute provided that "needy residents" who resided in Minnesota for six months or fewer were
entitled to only sixty percent of "the general assistance or work
readiness benefits that other.., residents of Minnesota receive[d]. 5 Thus, unlike Shapiro and Jones, the Minnesota statute did not involve a complete denial of benefits.
147

The state asserted that the purpose of the requirement was to encourage new

residents to join the work force. The opinion does not mention whether the requirement was part of a test for bona fide residence.
141 See Jones, 485 N.W.2d at 27-28. The court relied
on the Supreme Court's deferential standard in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), as the controlling standard of review. See id.
...
See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 82-83 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (disputing the Court's
claim that rewarding residents for past contributions is an unconstitutional interest
on the grounds that the Court only ruled as such when applying strict scrutiny).
1so See e.g., Poppe, supra note 145, at 298 (discussing
how the court in SotoLopez lessened the standard for applying strict scrutiny to include any "very important" benefit or right).
'' See Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Minn. 1993). The Statute
reduced general relief benefits during the first six months of a welfare recipient's
residency within the state. See id. at 199. The statute at issue in this case is similar
in structure and effect to recent statutes enacted in Rhode Island and Connecticut.
See statutes cited supra note 134.
112 Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d at 201.
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The Court aptly cited Maricopa for the proposition that a
statute may still penalize the right to interstate migration even
if it does not completely deny a benefit. 53 The Court acknowledged that the Constitution does not require that a state provide
welfare, but concluded that the Supreme Court has mandated
that "when a state decides to provide welfare benefits . .. the
state [must] distribute these benefits equally.., without distinguishing between its residents on the duration of their residency."1, 5 4 The Court then applied strict scrutiny and found the
state's asserted interest of conserving limited state resources to
be an impermissible interest under Shapiro.5
C. Pre-PRWORA Multi-Tiered DurationalResidency
Requirements
1. Brown v. Wing and Aumick v. Bane: "One can as well starve
in six months as in twelve."
The Supreme Court of New York, Monroe County, has analyzed multi-tier durational residency requirements under both
the New York State and United States Constitutions. 5 6 In
Aumick, the court examined a statutory requirement which limited Home Relief benefits to those who had resided within New
York for six months or less. 157 The statute provided that for the
first six months of residency in the state, one would be entitled
only to the greater of eighty percent of the New York standard
amount or the applicant's level of benefits in her state of prior
residence.'5 8 The statute in Brown was even less generous: it
eliminated the eighty percent guarantee and applied to both
'm See id. at 201; see also Poppe, supra note 145, at 78 (concluding that the
Minnesota statute in Mitchell penalized the right of interstate travel).
14 Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d. at 203.
1 See id.
See Brown v. Wing, 649 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1994); Aumick v. Bane, 612
N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
157Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 770-72. Such benefits, unlike AFDC
benefits, were
solely funded through state and local sources. See id. at 769. Home Relief benefits
are intended for individuals not capable of maintaining themselves. See id.; see also
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §158(f) (McKinney 1992) (limiting the amount of benefits provided to applicants establishing residency within the preceding six month period).
'5 See Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72. Prior to July 1, 1992, the length of an
applicant's residency had no effect on the amount of Home Relief benefits received.
See id&The law was amended in order to reduce the cost of public assistance. See id.;
see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §158(f) (McKinney 1992).
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Home Relief and AFDC benefits."9 Thus, whereas the former
statute guaranteed a level of minimum benefits, the latter did
not.16 After determining that the statutes violated New York
State's Constitution,"' both courts held that the statutes penalized the right to travel, and thus, violated the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. "
The courts rejected the State's attempt to distinguish
Shapiro on grounds that the Shapiro deprivation of benefits
lasted for one year, stating: "[olne can as well starve in six
months as in twelve." 3 The courts correctly found that the New
York statutes, in essence, deprived newer residents of the basic
necessities of life solely on the basis of their recent migration
into the state.'" Finding that the statutes penalized the right to
travel in both cases, the courts applied strict scrutiny equal protection analysis and held the statutes unconstitutional."
D. PRWORA Multi-TierBenefits: Confusion Among the Ranks
1.

Roe v. Anderson and Green v. Anderson
In both Green 168 and Roe,'67 a federal district court58 and the
118 Brown,

649 N.Y.S.2d at 988; see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §131-a(3)(d)

(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997-1998) (allowing a monthly supplemental home energy grant). This section was repealed, effective August 20, 1977. See id..
'c For example, the plaintiffs seeking Home Relief benefits in Brown had resided in Florida and Puerto Rico prior to migrating north to New York. See Brown,
649 N.Y.S.2d at 988. Because neither Florida nor Puerto Rico provided analogous

benefits, the residents were completely denied Home Relief benefits. See id. at 98990.
161See Brown 649 N.Y.S.2d at 993; Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72. The New
York State Constitution requires that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine." N.Y.S. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (McKinney 1987). Brown and Aumick both
held that this provision forbids the legislature from creating "classification[s] of welfare recipients by standards other than need itself." Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 992
(citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (1977)); accord Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 770
(citing same). In both cases, the court held the statute in question unconstitutional
because the classifications created by the legislature were not need-based classifications. See Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 993; Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
'6 See Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 995; Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
1

Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 994.

See Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93; Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
See Brown, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 995-96; Aumick, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73.
1
811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affid mem., 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as unripe, 513 U.S. 557 (1995).
1'7 966 F.Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998).
16
1
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Ninth Circuit, respectively, preliminarily enjoined the prototypical multi-tier durational residency requirement explicitly
authorized by PRWORA.5 9 The cases concerned a California
welfare law which provided that those residing in the state for
less than twelve months would be entitled only to the lesser of
the benefits offered by California or the benefits offered by their
state of prior residence.17 ° This statutory scheme created classifications of otherwise similarly situated
residents based on the
171
state.
the
into
entry
their
of
timing
The Green court held that the statute penalized plaintiffs for
their decision to migrate to California because it "limit[ed] ...
the basic necessities of life." 7" The court, citing Maricopa, dismissed the argument that the statutory scheme was not a penalty because it merely reduced, but did not eliminate, all AFDC
benefits.'7 ' The court stated that the statutory scheme was "not
16

The same district court judge decided both cases. See Roe, 966 F. Supp. at

977; Green, 811 F. Supp. at 516. In Green, the court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of California's durational residency requirement, which
had been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). Green,
811 F. Supp. at 523. A Ninth Circuit three judge panel approved the decision without opinion. See Green, 26 F.3d 95, 95 (9th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari,and oral arguments took place. See Anderson v. Green, No. 94-197, 1995
U.S. TRANS. LEXIS 76, at "13 (Oral Argument, Jan. 17, 1995). Prior to oral argument, however, the Ninth Circuit vacated the HHS approval of California's plan. See
Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Secretary's
approval of California's multi-tiered system was arbitrary and capricious). Thus, because the plan did not and could not go into effect until the Secretary gave her approval, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court. See Green,
513 U.S. 557, 559-60. After Congress passed PRWORA, California reinstated its
statute in its identical form and, once again, plaintiffs brought the statute before the
district court for review. See Roe, 966 F. Supp. at 977.
In Roe, the district court incorporated its Green analysis by reference. See Roe
v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1403-04 (9e Cir. 1998). Despite California's argument
that the policy change signified by PRWORA rendered Green outdated, the Ninth
Circuit held that its "prior affirmance of the district court's decision in Green remains viable as persuasive authority." Id. at 1404.
169 See Roe, 134 F.3d at 1405; Green, 811 F. Supp. at 523.
170 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 1997).
171 For example, in Green, one plaintiff moved from Louisiana to California. See
Green, 811 F. Supp. at 517. As a result of the multi-tier benefit scheme, she received
only $190 per month whereas an otherwise similarly situated resident who had established residence more than one year prior would receive $624 per month. See id.
Another plaintiff moved to California from Colorado, and received only $280 per
month compared with a similarly situated resident's $504 per month payment. See
id.
172 Id.
at 521.
'73 See id.
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constitutional because it materially diminishes... AFDC benefits."74 The State also argued that the statute was not a penalty
because the new residents still received the same benefits that
they had received in their prior state of residence.175 Citing
Zobel, the court held that the appropriate comparison is between
older and newer bona fide residents of California, not between
newer bona fide residents of California and residents of other
states. 6
The court then strictly scrutinized California's interest in
creating the multi-tier system. It found that the State's sole
purpose in passing the statute, to conserve limited state resources, was 'audable... yet unconstitutional."77 The court
also asserted that the statute would not even pass rational basis
review as applied in Zobel, Hooper, and Soto-Lopez. 178 Because
the state's only stated purpose was unconstitutional on its face,
the statute "lack[ed] a rational design."' 7
2.

Maldonado v. Houstoun: Contempt For the Penalty Analysis
In Maldonado,8 ' a federal district court analyzed a Pennsylvania durational residency requirement that was almost identical to the enjoined statute in Green and Roe.'8' The court's
analysis, however, differed from that of the California district
court. The Maldonado court, similarly to the Roe court, began
its analysis by tracing the recent welfare reform, discussing the
right to travel, and analyzing Shapiro and its progeny.'82
Whereas the Green and Roe court did not appear to experience
174 Id.

See id.
id. In addition, the Court dismissed this argument because even the
-comparison between the newer residents and residents of their former state generally fails once the cost of living is adjusted for their new abode. See id.; cf. Anderson v. Green, No. 94-197, 1995 U.S. TRANS. LFXIS 76, at *13 (Oral Argument, Jan.
17, 1995) (questioning State's argument because of the State's failure to take increased cost of living into effect).
'7 Green, 811 F. Supp. at 522.
178 See id. (stating that there has never been a Supreme Court decision upholding a durational residency requirement where the sole interest was to conserve
state resources).
179 Id. at 523.
"

176See

'80 177 F.R.D. 311
181 Compare CAL.

(E.D. Pa. 1997).
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 1994), with 62 PA.

CONS. STAT. § 432(5)(ii) (West 1997).
'8

Compare Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 311-17, 323-28, with Roe, 966 F. Supp. at
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discomfort in applying Shapiro and its progeny," the Maldonado court repeatedly criticized the Supreme Court's right to
travel jurisprudence as "unsettled" and "fractured."' The court
proceeded to determine that Pennsylvania's durational residency
requirement did not penalize the constitutional right to interstate travel."" The court reasoned that although the newer resident's TANF benefits were reduced to a level below the standard
amount, they still received other forms of benefits. 8 ' Thus, the
court held that the multi-tier system did not deprive the residents of the basic necessities of life.'87 This determination is both
inconsistent with Shapiro and with the facts of the case. The
Maldonado court somehow determined that non-cash payments
of food stamps, medical assistance, and job-search assistance
militated against the finding of a penalty in spite of the fact that
the plaintiffs monthly benefits did not even exceed their
monthly rent. 8 The court also reasoned that the plaintiffs right
to travel was not penalized because she received no less benefits
then she did before she moved to Pennsylvania.'8 9 The Green
court correctly rejected this argument on two grounds: (1) if the
increase in cost of living is accounted for, plaintiffs benefits actually decrease;' and (2) the appropriate comparison in a right
to travel equal protection case is between the new resident and
older residents of the state imposing the requirement. 9 ' The
Maldonado court's final justification for failing to find a penalty
is that "the Supreme Court has subtly moved away from applying the penalty analysis in cases where there has been no pen-

1 See, e.g., Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521 ("In light of [Shapiro and its progeny]...
discussed above, [California's] durational residency requirement... must be invalid.").
4 Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 323 ("[Tlhis [clourt cannot await a clarifying decision by the Supreme Court but rather this [ciourt must attempt to apply this fractured area of law to the facts of this case.").
18
"'

See id. at 330.

15

Green, 811 F. Supp. at 521.

See id. at 331 (citing resident's receipt of benefits such as food stamps, medical benefits, and assistance in finding employment).
1 7 See id. at 331-32.
"'sId. at 317. The plaintiffs received only $304 per month which did not meet
their $350 per month rent, compared to $836 per month received by similarly situated families who had resided in Pennsylvania for more than one year. See id.
See id. at 331.
1 See id. at 522 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982); see also Roe v.
Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9"h Cir. 1998) (affirning the use of such a standard).
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alty in the traditional sense." ' 92
The Maldonado court did not mask its contempt for the
penalty analysis. It asserted that "the 'penalty' that is allegedly
imposed in these cases is a mere legal fiction."'93 Although the
Maldonado court purported to apply Shapiro to the facts of this
case, it seems that the court's disdain for the penalty analysis
drives its holding. Although the Supreme Court has arguably
limited its penalty analysis to durational residency requirements
that burden the basic necessities of life or a fundamental right,
there is no indication that the Court will abdicate the penalty
analysis entirely.'94 In the instant case, Pennsylvania's durational residency requirement clearly deprives the plaintiff of the
basic necessities of life.9
The Maldonado court should have
found that this deprivation equated to Pennsylvania imposing a
penalty on the plaintiff for exercising her right to interstate migration.
The Maldonado court, however, did not differ from Green in
all respects. Both courts held that the multi-tier benefit schemes
fail to pass the Supreme Court's heightened rational basis re"'
view. 96
Pennsylvania's first asserted interest was to discourage
indigent migration into the state.'97 Here, the court correctly relied on Shapiro and held that the "welfare magnet" rationale is
constitutionally impermissible. 9 ' Pennsylvania also asserted
that it erected the multi-tier scheme in order to encourage new
residents to join its work force.'99 The court again relied on
Shapiro and held that the multi-tier durational residency
Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 331-32.
'93Id. at 331 n.25; see also Zubler, supra note 8, at 897-98 (discussing traditional
penalties such as "a lost benefit.., a person would have received had she not exercised some constitutional right").
'94 See e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(refusing to extend strict scrutiny of equal protection to a broad range of basic necessities, including education). In Shapiro, Justice Harlan dissented on the grounds
that scrict scrutiny might thereafter be applied frequently to any law relating to necessities so as to "swallow the standard equal protection rule." Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In light of cases such as
Rodriquez, Justice Harlan's concerns should be reduced.
W'See Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 317. The plaintiffs in Maldonado contended
that the multi-tier durational residency requirement deprived them of "basic necessities such as shelter, winter heat, clothing, and food." Id.
'9' See Green, 811 F. Supp. at 522-23; Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 328.
'97 See Maldonado, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15474, at *57.
'92

""'See id. at 329 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629).
9 See id. at 328.
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not rationally related to this admittedly legitimate
scheme was
200
interest.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the
right to travel has been somewhat unsettled, its decision in
Shapiro still stands. The Constitution does not permit a state to
deny an otherwise eligible welfare recipient the basic necessities
of life as a penalty for exercising her fundamental right to interstate migration. The PRWORA has induced states into creating
such constitutionally impermissible penalties by, providing legislative permission for multi-tier durational residency requirements. When such durational residency requirements reach the
Supreme Court for review, the Court should apply the principles
of the Shapiro trilogy and strike down these invidious classifications.
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